net-libs/libsrtp: 1.6.0-r1 OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility

Uses the patches from FreeBSD, see
https://svnweb.freebsd.org/ports?view=revision&revision=472170

Also EAPI=7

Closes: https://bugs.gentoo.org/666160
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.52, Repoman-2.3.12
Signed-off-by: Craig Andrews <candrews@gentoo.org>

4 files changed, 811 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d17cb426e88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/0b45423678ddc46d702f3a51614f20bfbd112ddd
+
+--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c	2018-06-11 07:46:09 UTC
++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
+@@ -117,6 +117,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int 
+     }
+     memset(gcm, 0x0, sizeof(aes_gcm_ctx_t));
+ 
++    gcm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++    if (gcm->ctx == NULL) {
++        crypto_free(gcm);
++        crypto_free(*c);
++        *c = NULL;
++        return err_status_alloc_fail;
++    }
++
+     /* set pointers */
+     (*c)->state = gcm;
+ 
+@@ -140,7 +148,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int 
+ 
+     /* set key size        */
+     (*c)->key_len = key_len;
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&gcm->ctx);
+ 
+     return (err_status_ok);
+ }
+@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
+ 
+     ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx_t*)c->state;
+     if (ctx) {
+-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx);
++        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+         /* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */
+         switch (ctx->key_size) {
+         case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+@@ -205,7 +212,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) {
++    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) {
+         return (err_status_init_fail);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -227,19 +234,19 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c,
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(iv));
+ 
+-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL,
++    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                            NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) {
+         return (err_status_init_fail);
+     }
+ 
+     /* set IV len  and the IV value, the followiong 3 calls are required */
+-    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) {
++    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) {
+         return (err_status_init_fail);
+     }
+-    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) {
++    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) {
+         return (err_status_init_fail);
+     }
+-    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) {
++    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) {
+         return (err_status_init_fail);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -263,9 +270,9 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_aad (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
+      * Set dummy tag, OpenSSL requires the Tag to be set before
+      * processing AAD
+      */
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad);
+ 
+-    rv = EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len);
++    rv = EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len);
+     if (rv != aad_len) {
+         return (err_status_algo_fail);
+     } else {
+@@ -291,7 +298,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_encrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
+     /*
+      * Encrypt the data
+      */
+-    EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len);
++    EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len);
+ 
+     return (err_status_ok);
+ }
+@@ -313,12 +320,12 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_get_tag (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
+     /*
+      * Calculate the tag
+      */
+-    EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0);
++    EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 
+     /*
+      * Retreive the tag
+      */
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf);
+ 
+     /*
+      * Increase encryption length by desired tag size
+@@ -347,14 +354,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_decrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
+     /*
+      * Set the tag before decrypting
+      */
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, 
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len,
+ 	                buf + (*enc_len - c->tag_len));
+-    EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len);
++    EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len);
+ 
+     /*
+      * Check the tag
+      */
+-    if (EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
++    if (EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+         return (err_status_auth_fail);
+     }
+ 
+--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c	2018-06-11 07:46:00 UTC
++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
+@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int 
+     }
+     memset(icm, 0x0, sizeof(aes_icm_ctx_t));
+ 
++    icm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++    if (icm->ctx == NULL) {
++        crypto_free(icm);
++        crypto_free(*c);
++        *c = NULL;
++        return err_status_alloc_fail;
++    }
++
+     /* set pointers */
+     (*c)->state = icm;
+ 
+@@ -173,7 +181,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int 
+ 
+     /* set key size        */
+     (*c)->key_len = key_len;
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&icm->ctx);
+ 
+     return err_status_ok;
+ }
+@@ -195,7 +202,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
+      */
+     ctx = (aes_icm_ctx_t*)c->state;
+     if (ctx != NULL) {
+-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx);
++        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+         /* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */
+         switch (ctx->key_size) {
+         case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+@@ -257,8 +264,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
+     debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key:  %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size));
+     debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
+ 
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ctx);
+-
+     switch (c->key_size) {
+     case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+         evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+@@ -276,7 +281,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
++    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, evp,
+                             NULL, key, NULL)) {
+         return err_status_fail;
+     } else {
+@@ -304,7 +309,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c,
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
+ 
+-    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL,
++    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, NULL,
+                             NULL, NULL, c->counter.v8)) {
+         return err_status_fail;
+     } else {
+@@ -326,12 +331,12 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_encrypt (aes_icm_ctx_t *c
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "rs0: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
+ 
+-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) {
++    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) {
+         return err_status_cipher_fail;
+     }
+     *enc_len = len;
+ 
+-    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&c->ctx, buf, &len)) {
++    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(c->ctx, buf, &len)) {
+         return err_status_cipher_fail;
+     }
+     *enc_len += len;
+--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c	2018-06-11 07:45:39 UTC
++++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
+@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ err_status_t
+ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
+ {
+     extern auth_type_t hmac;
+-    uint8_t *pointer;
+-    HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len);
+     debug_print(mod_hmac, "                          tag length %d", out_len);
+@@ -76,21 +74,43 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
+         return err_status_bad_param;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
+-    pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+-    if (pointer == NULL) {
++/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 made HMAC_CTX an opaque structure, which must be allocated
++   using HMAC_CTX_new.  But this function doesn't exist in OpenSSL 1.0.x. */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
++    {
++        /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
++        uint8_t* pointer;
++        HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
++        pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
++        if (pointer == NULL) {
++            return err_status_alloc_fail;
++        }
++        *a = (auth_t*)pointer;
++        (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t);
++        new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
++
++        HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
++    }
++
++#else
++    *a = (auth_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(auth_t));
++    if (*a == NULL) {
+         return err_status_alloc_fail;
+     }
+ 
++    (*a)->state = HMAC_CTX_new();
++    if ((*a)->state == NULL) {
++        crypto_free(*a);
++        *a = NULL;
++        return err_status_alloc_fail;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     /* set pointers */
+-    *a = (auth_t*)pointer;
+     (*a)->type = &hmac;
+-    (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t);
+     (*a)->out_len = out_len;
+     (*a)->key_len = key_len;
+     (*a)->prefix_len = 0;
+-    new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
+-    HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
+ 
+     /* increment global count of all hmac uses */
+     hmac.ref_count++;
+@@ -106,11 +126,19 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
+ 
+     hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state;
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
+     HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx);
+ 
+     /* zeroize entire state*/
+     octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a,
+                              sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
++
++#else
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
++
++    /* zeroize entire state*/
++    octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a, sizeof(auth_t));
++#endif
+ 
+     /* free memory */
+     crypto_free(a);
+--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h	2018-06-11 07:46:09 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
+ typedef struct {
+   int      key_size;
+   int      tag_len;
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
+   cipher_direction_t dir;
+ } aes_gcm_ctx_t;
+ 
+--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h	2018-06-11 07:46:00 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typedef struct {
+     v128_t counter;                /* holds the counter value          */
+     v128_t offset;                 /* initial offset value             */
+     int key_size;
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
+ } aes_icm_ctx_t;
+ 
+ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir);
+--- a/crypto/include/sha1.h	2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/sha1.h
+@@ -56,8 +56,6 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <stdint.h>
+ 
+-typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
+-
+ /*
+  * sha1_init(&ctx) initializes the SHA1 context ctx
+  *
+@@ -72,6 +70,12 @@ typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
+  *
+  */
+ 
++/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 made EVP_MD_CTX an opaque structure, which must be allocated
++   using EVP_MD_CTX_new. But this function doesn't exist in OpenSSL 1.0.x. */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
++
++typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
++
+ static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx)
+ {
+     EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+@@ -88,7 +92,33 @@ static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32
+     unsigned int len = 0;
+ 
+     EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len);
++    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ }
++
++#else
++
++typedef EVP_MD_CTX* sha1_ctx_t;
++
++static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx)
++{
++    *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++    EVP_DigestInit(*ctx, EVP_sha1());
++}
++
++static inline void sha1_update (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *M, int octets_in_msg)
++{
++    EVP_DigestUpdate(*ctx, M, octets_in_msg);
++}
++
++static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32_t *output)
++{
++    unsigned int len = 0;
++
++    EVP_DigestFinal(*ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len);
++    EVP_MD_CTX_free(*ctx);
++}
++#endif
++
+ #else
+ #include "datatypes.h"
+ 
diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c85e3750a1b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/1acba569915d8124b627a29dd5e3500332618eac
+
+--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c	2018-06-10 18:51:02 UTC
++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
+@@ -187,22 +187,28 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
+  */
+ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key)
+ {
++    const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
++
+     c->dir = direction_any;
+ 
+-    /* copy key to be used later when CiscoSSL crypto context is created */
+-    v128_copy_octet_string((v128_t*)&c->key, key);
++    debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key:  %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size));
+ 
+-    if (c->key_size == AES_256_KEYSIZE) {
+-        debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "Copying last 16 bytes of key: %s",
+-                    v128_hex_string((v128_t*)(key + AES_128_KEYSIZE)));
+-        v128_copy_octet_string(((v128_t*)(&c->key.v8)) + 1, 
+-		               key + AES_128_KEYSIZE);
++    switch (c->key_size) {
++    case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
++        evp = EVP_aes_256_gcm();
++        break;
++    case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
++        evp = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
++        break;
++    default:
++        return (err_status_bad_param);
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+-    debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key:  %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key));
++    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) {
++        return (err_status_init_fail);
++    }
+ 
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx);
+-
+     return (err_status_ok);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -214,8 +220,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx
+ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, void *iv,
+ 	                             int direction)
+ {
+-    const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+-
+     if (direction != direction_encrypt && direction != direction_decrypt) {
+         return (err_status_bad_param);
+     }
+@@ -223,19 +227,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c,
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(iv));
+ 
+-    switch (c->key_size) {
+-    case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+-        evp = EVP_aes_256_gcm();
+-        break;
+-    case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
+-        evp = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
+-        break;
+-    default:
+-        return (err_status_bad_param);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, (const unsigned char*)&c->key.v8,
++    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                            NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) {
+         return (err_status_init_fail);
+     }
+--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h	2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
+@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
+ #include <openssl/aes.h>
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+-  v256_t   key;
+   int      key_size;
+   int      tag_len;
+   EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c2cf3ff2057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/fb954450198c832c96b4191fcef3a1b9e2d15d8b
+
+--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c	2018-06-10 20:33:16 UTC
++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
+@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
+  */
+ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key, int len)
+ {
++    const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
++
+     /*
+      * set counter and initial values to 'offset' value, being careful not to
+      * go past the end of the key buffer
+@@ -252,30 +254,35 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
+     c->offset.v8[SALT_SIZE] = c->offset.v8[SALT_SIZE + 1] = 0;
+     c->counter.v8[SALT_SIZE] = c->counter.v8[SALT_SIZE + 1] = 0;
+ 
+-    /* copy key to be used later when CiscoSSL crypto context is created */
+-    v128_copy_octet_string((v128_t*)&c->key, key);
++    debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key:  %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size));
++    debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
+ 
+-    /* if the key is greater than 16 bytes, copy the second
+-     * half.  Note, we treat AES-192 and AES-256 the same here
+-     * for simplicity.  The storage location receiving the
+-     * key is statically allocated to handle a full 32 byte key
+-     * regardless of the cipher in use.
+-     */
+-    if (c->key_size == AES_256_KEYSIZE
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ctx);
++
++    switch (c->key_size) {
++    case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
++        evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
++        break;
+ #ifndef SRTP_NO_AES192
+-        || c->key_size == AES_192_KEYSIZE
++    case AES_192_KEYSIZE:
++        evp = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
++        break;
+ #endif
+-        ) {
+-        debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "Copying last 16 bytes of key: %s",
+-                    v128_hex_string((v128_t*)(key + AES_128_KEYSIZE)));
+-        v128_copy_octet_string(((v128_t*)(&c->key.v8)) + 1, key + AES_128_KEYSIZE);
++    case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
++        evp = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
++        break;
++    default:
++        return err_status_bad_param;
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+-    debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key:  %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key));
+-    debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
++    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
++                            NULL, key, NULL)) {
++        return err_status_fail;
++    } else {
++        return err_status_ok;
++    }
+ 
+-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx);
+-
+     return err_status_ok;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -286,7 +293,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
+  */
+ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir)
+ {
+-    const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+     v128_t nonce;
+ 
+     /* set nonce (for alignment) */
+@@ -298,25 +304,8 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c,
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
+ 
+-    switch (c->key_size) {
+-    case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+-        evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+-        break;
+-#ifndef SRTP_NO_AES192
+-    case AES_192_KEYSIZE:
+-        evp = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
+-        break;
+-#endif
+-    case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
+-        evp = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
+-        break;
+-    default:
+-        return err_status_bad_param;
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
+-                            NULL, c->key.v8, c->counter.v8)) {
++    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL,
++                            NULL, NULL, c->counter.v8)) {
+         return err_status_fail;
+     } else {
+         return err_status_ok;
+--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
+@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@
+ typedef struct {
+     v128_t counter;                /* holds the counter value          */
+     v128_t offset;                 /* initial offset value             */
+-    v256_t key;
+     int key_size;
+     EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ } aes_icm_ctx_t;
diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c9973f214fc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/5781341d99cd286a1f3d164e0576c2e837a444b7
+
+--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c	2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
+@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@
+     #include <config.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-#include "hmac.h"
++#include "auth.h"
+ #include "alloc.h"
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
+-#define HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX		20
++#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE		20
+ 
+ /* the debug module for authentiation */
+ 
+@@ -65,26 +66,18 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
+ {
+     extern auth_type_t hmac;
+     uint8_t *pointer;
+-    hmac_ctx_t *new_hmac_ctx;
++    HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len);
+     debug_print(mod_hmac, "                          tag length %d", out_len);
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
+-     * than 20 bytes yet
+-     */
+-    if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+-        return err_status_bad_param;
+-    }
+-
+     /* check output length - should be less than 20 bytes */
+-    if (out_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
++    if (out_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+         return err_status_bad_param;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* allocate memory for auth and hmac_ctx_t structures */
+-    pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
++    /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
++    pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+     if (pointer == NULL) {
+         return err_status_alloc_fail;
+     }
+@@ -96,8 +89,8 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
+     (*a)->out_len = out_len;
+     (*a)->key_len = key_len;
+     (*a)->prefix_len = 0;
+-    new_hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)((*a)->state);
+-    memset(new_hmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(hmac_ctx_t));
++    new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
++    HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
+ 
+     /* increment global count of all hmac uses */
+     hmac.ref_count++;
+@@ -109,19 +102,15 @@ err_status_t
+ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
+ {
+     extern auth_type_t hmac;
+-    hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx;
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
+ 
+-    hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)a->state;
+-    if (hmac_ctx->ctx_initialized) {
+-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->ctx);
+-    }
+-    if (hmac_ctx->init_ctx_initialized) {
+-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->init_ctx);
+-    }
++    hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state;
+ 
++    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx);
++
+     /* zeroize entire state*/
+     octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a,
+-                             sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
++                             sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+ 
+     /* free memory */
+     crypto_free(a);
+@@ -133,113 +122,65 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
+ }
+ 
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_init (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
++hmac_init (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
+ {
+-    int i;
+-    uint8_t ipad[64];
++    if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, key, key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0)
++        return err_status_auth_fail;
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
+-     * than 20 bytes yet
+-     */
+-    if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+-        return err_status_bad_param;
+-    }
+-
+-    /*
+-     * set values of ipad and opad by exoring the key into the
+-     * appropriate constant values
+-     */
+-    for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) {
+-        ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
+-        state->opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
+-    }
+-    /* set the rest of ipad, opad to constant values */
+-    for (; i < sizeof(ipad); i++) {
+-        ipad[i] = 0x36;
+-        ((uint8_t*)state->opad)[i] = 0x5c;
+-    }
+-
+-    debug_print(mod_hmac, "ipad: %s", octet_string_hex_string(ipad, sizeof(ipad)));
+-
+-    /* initialize sha1 context */
+-    sha1_init(&state->init_ctx);
+-    state->init_ctx_initialized = 1;
+-
+-    /* hash ipad ^ key */
+-    sha1_update(&state->init_ctx, ipad, sizeof(ipad));
+-    return (hmac_start(state));
++    return err_status_ok;
+ }
+ 
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_start (hmac_ctx_t *state)
++hmac_start (HMAC_CTX *state)
+ {
+-    if (state->ctx_initialized) {
+-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&state->ctx);
+-    }
+-    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&state->ctx, &state->init_ctx)) {
++    if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) == 0)
+         return err_status_auth_fail;
+-    } else {
+-        state->ctx_initialized = 1;
+-        return err_status_ok;
+-    }
++
++    return err_status_ok;
+ }
+ 
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_update (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
++hmac_update (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
+ {
+     debug_print(mod_hmac, "input: %s",
+                 octet_string_hex_string(message, msg_octets));
+ 
+-    /* hash message into sha1 context */
+-    sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
++    if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
++        return err_status_auth_fail;
+ 
+     return err_status_ok;
+ }
+ 
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
++hmac_compute (HMAC_CTX *state, const void *message,
+               int msg_octets, int tag_len, uint8_t *result)
+ {
+-    uint32_t hash_value[5];
+-    uint32_t H[5];
++    uint8_t hash_value[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+     int i;
++    unsigned int len;
+ 
+     /* check tag length, return error if we can't provide the value expected */
+-    if (tag_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
++    if (tag_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+         return err_status_bad_param;
+     }
+ 
+     /* hash message, copy output into H */
+-    sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
+-    sha1_final(&state->ctx, H);
++    if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
++        return err_status_auth_fail;
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * note that we don't need to debug_print() the input, since the
+-     * function hmac_update() already did that for us
+-     */
+-    debug_print(mod_hmac, "intermediate state: %s",
+-                octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H)));
++    if (HMAC_Final(state, hash_value, &len) == 0)
++        return err_status_auth_fail;
+ 
+-    /* re-initialize hash context */
+-    sha1_init(&state->ctx);
++    if (len < tag_len)
++        return err_status_auth_fail;
+ 
+-    /* hash opad ^ key  */
+-    sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)state->opad, sizeof(state->opad));
+-
+-    /* hash the result of the inner hash */
+-    sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H));
+-
+-    /* the result is returned in the array hash_value[] */
+-    sha1_final(&state->ctx, hash_value);
+-
+     /* copy hash_value to *result */
+     for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
+-        result[i] = ((uint8_t*)hash_value)[i];
++        result[i] = hash_value[i];
+     }
+ 
+     debug_print(mod_hmac, "output: %s",
+-                octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)hash_value, tag_len));
++                octet_string_hex_string(hash_value, tag_len));
+ 
+     return err_status_ok;
+ }
+@@ -248,7 +189,7 @@ hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
+ /* begin test case 0 */
+ 
+ uint8_t
+-    hmac_test_case_0_key[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = {
++    hmac_test_case_0_key[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
+     0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+     0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+     0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
+@@ -260,7 +201,7 @@ uint8_t
+ };
+ 
+ uint8_t
+-    hmac_test_case_0_tag[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = {
++    hmac_test_case_0_tag[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
+     0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, 0x72, 0x64,
+     0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x8c, 0x8e,
+     0xf1, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x00
+--- a/crypto/include/hmac.h	2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/hmac.h
+@@ -53,10 +53,6 @@ typedef struct {
+   uint8_t    opad[64];
+   sha1_ctx_t ctx;
+   sha1_ctx_t init_ctx;
+-#ifdef OPENSSL
+-  int ctx_initialized;
+-  int init_ctx_initialized;
+-#endif
+ } hmac_ctx_t;
+ 
+ err_status_t