# Copyright 1999-2010 Gentoo Foundation # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 # $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.4_p3-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2010/09/07 12:00:58 a3li Exp $ inherit eutils pam MY_P=${P/_/} MY_P=${MY_P/beta/b} case "${P}" in *_beta* | *_rc*) uri_prefix=beta/ ;; *) uri_prefix="" ;; esac DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users" HOMEPAGE="http://www.sudo.ws/" SRC_URI="http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz" # Basic license is ISC-style as-is, some files are released under # 3-clause BSD license LICENSE="as-is BSD" SLOT="0" KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 arm hppa ia64 ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 s390 sh sparc x86 ~sparc-fbsd ~x86-fbsd" IUSE="pam skey offensive ldap selinux" DEPEND="pam? ( virtual/pam ) ldap? ( >=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1 dev-libs/cyrus-sasl ) !pam? ( skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 ) ) app-editors/gentoo-editor virtual/editor virtual/mta" RDEPEND="selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo ) ldap? ( dev-lang/perl ) pam? ( sys-auth/pambase ) ${DEPEND}" DEPEND="${DEPEND} sys-devel/bison" S=${WORKDIR}/${MY_P} pkg_setup() { if use pam && use skey; then ewarn "You cannot enable both S/KEY and PAM at the same time, PAM will" ewarn "be used then." fi } src_unpack() { unpack ${A}; cd "${S}" # compatability fix. epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-skeychallengeargs.diff epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2010-2956.patch # additional variables to disallow, should user disable env_reset. # NOTE: this is not a supported mode of operation, these variables # are added to the blacklist as a convenience to administrators # who fail to heed the warnings of allowing untrusted users # to access sudo. # # there is *no possible way* to foresee all attack vectors in # all possible applications that could potentially be used via # sudo, these settings will just delay the inevitable. # # that said, I will accept suggestions for variables that can # be misused in _common_ interpreters or libraries, such as # perl, bash, python, ruby, etc., in the hope of dissuading # a casual attacker. # XXX: perl should be using suid_perl. # XXX: users can remove/add more via env_delete and env_check. # XXX: = probably safe enough for most circumstances. einfo "Blacklisting common variables (env_delete)..." sudo_bad_var() { local target='env.c' marker='\*initial_badenv_table\[\]' ebegin " $1" sed -i 's#\(^.*'${marker}'.*$\)#\1\n\t"'${1}'",#' "${S}"/${target} eend $? } sudo_bad_var 'PERLIO_DEBUG' # perl, write debug to file. sudo_bad_var 'FPATH' # ksh, search path for functions. sudo_bad_var 'NULLCMD' # zsh, command on null-redir. sudo_bad_var 'READNULLCMD' # zsh, command on null-redir. sudo_bad_var 'GLOBIGNORE' # bash, glob paterns to ignore. sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONHOME' # python, module search path. sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONPATH' # python, search path. sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONINSPECT' # python, allow inspection. sudo_bad_var 'RUBYLIB' # ruby, lib load path. sudo_bad_var 'RUBYOPT' # ruby, cl options. sudo_bad_var 'ZDOTDIR' # zsh, path to search for dotfiles. einfo "...done." # prevent binaries from being stripped. sed -i 's/\($(INSTALL).*\) -s \(.*[(sudo|visudo)]\)/\1 \2/g' Makefile.in } src_compile() { local line ROOTPATH # FIXME: secure_path is a compile time setting. using ROOTPATH # is not perfect, env-update may invalidate this, but until it # is available as a sudoers setting this will have to do. einfo "Setting secure_path..." # why not use grep? variable might be expanded from other variables # declared in that file. cannot just source the file, would override # any variables already set. eval `PS4= bash -x /etc/profile.env 2>&1 | \ while read line; do case $line in ROOTPATH=*) echo $line; break;; *) continue;; esac done` && einfo " Found ROOTPATH..." || \ ewarn " Failed to find ROOTPATH, please report this." # remove duplicate path entries from $1 cleanpath() { local i=1 x n IFS=: local -a paths; paths=($1) for ((n=${#paths[*]}-1;i<=n;i++)); do for ((x=0;x&2 unset paths[i]; continue 2; } done; # einfo " Adding ${paths[i]}..." 1>&2 done; echo "${paths[*]}" } ROOTPATH=$(cleanpath /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/opt/bin${ROOTPATH:+:${ROOTPATH}}) # strip gcc path (bug #136027) rmpath() { declare e newpath oldpath=${!1} PATHvar=$1 thisp IFS=: shift for thisp in $oldpath; do for e; do [[ $thisp == $e ]] && continue 2; done newpath=$newpath:$thisp done eval $PATHvar='${newpath#:}' } rmpath ROOTPATH '*/gcc-bin/*' einfo "...done." if use pam; then myconf="--with-pam --without-skey" elif use skey; then myconf="--without-pam --with-skey" else myconf="--without-pam --without-skey" fi # audit: somebody got to explain me how I can test this before I # enable it.. — Diego econf --with-secure-path="${ROOTPATH}" \ --with-editor=/usr/libexec/gentoo-editor \ --with-env-editor \ $(use_with offensive insults) \ $(use_with offensive all-insults) \ $(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo) \ $(use_with ldap) \ --without-linux-audit \ --with-timedir=/var/db/sudo \ --docdir=/usr/share/doc/${PF} \ ${myconf} emake || die } src_install() { emake DESTDIR="${D}" install || die if use ldap; then dodoc README.LDAP schema.OpenLDAP dosbin sudoers2ldif cat - > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo <