# Copyright 1999-2005 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.6.8_p9.ebuild,v 1.15 2005/06/23 03:35:01 tester Exp $

inherit eutils pam

# TODO: Fix support for krb4 and krb5

DESCRIPTION="Allows certain users/groups to run commands as root"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.sudo.ws/"
SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${P/_/}.tar.gz"
LICENSE="Sudo"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 hppa ia64 ppc ppc64 sparc x86"
IUSE="pam skey offensive ldap"

DEPEND="pam? ( || ( virtual/pam sys-libs/pam ) )
	ldap? ( >=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1 )
	skey? ( >=app-admin/skey-1.1.5-r1 )
	sys-devel/bison
	virtual/mta"
RDEPEND="${DEPEND} ldap? ( dev-lang/perl )"

S=${WORKDIR}/${P/_/}

src_unpack() {
	unpack ${A}; cd ${S}

	# compatability fix.
	epatch ${FILESDIR}/${PN}-skeychallengeargs.diff

	# make tls_cacert synonymous with tls_cacertfile.
	epatch ${FILESDIR}/${PN}-1.6.8_p8-ldap-tls_cacert.diff

	# additional variables to disallow, should user disable env_reset.

	# NOTE: this is not a supported mode of operation, these variables
	#       are added to the blacklist as a convenience to administrators
	#       who fail to heed the warnings of allowing untrusted users
	#       to access sudo.
	#
	#       there is *no possible way* to foresee all attack vectors in
	#       all possible applications that could potentially be used via
	#       sudo, these settings will just delay the inevitable.
	#
	#       that said, I will accept suggestions for variables that can
	#       be misused in _common_ interpreters or libraries, such as
	#       perl, bash, python, ruby, etc., in the hope of dissuading
	#       a casual attacker.

	# XXX: perl should be using suid_perl.
	# XXX: users can remove/add more via env_delete and env_check.
	# XXX: <?> = probably safe enough for most circumstances.

	einfo "Blacklisting common variables (env_delete)..."
		sudo_bad_var 'SHELLOPTS'      # bash, change shoptions.
			# http://www.sudo.ws/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=182
			# http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1051
			# *sigh*
		sudo_bad_var 'PERLIO_DEBUG'   # perl, write debug to file.
		sudo_bad_var 'PERL5LIB'       # perl, change search path.
		sudo_bad_var 'PERLLIB'        # perl, change search path.
#		sudo_bad_var 'PERL_HASH_SEED' # perl, change seed. <?>
#		sudo_bad_var 'PERL_HASH_SEED_DEBUG' # perl, disclose seed. <?>
#		sudo_bad_var 'PERL_SIGNALS'   # perl, use deferred signals. <?>
		sudo_bad_var 'FPATH'          # ksh, search path for functions.
		sudo_bad_var 'PS4'            # sh, in case set -x is used. <?>
		sudo_bad_var 'NULLCMD'        # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
		sudo_bad_var 'READNULLCMD'    # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
#		sudo_bad_var 'TMPPREFIX'      # zsh, prefix for tmp files. <?>
		sudo_bad_var 'GLOBIGNORE'     # bash, glob paterns to ignore. <?>
		sudo_bad_var 'PERL5OPT'       # perl, set options.
		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONHOME'     # python, module search path.
		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONPATH'     # python, search path.
		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONINSPECT'  # python, allow inspection.
		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYLIB'        # ruby, lib load path.
		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYOPT'        # ruby, cl options.
#		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYPATH'       # ruby, script search path. <?>
		sudo_bad_var 'ZDOTDIR'        # zsh, path to search for dotfiles.
	einfo "...done."

	# prevent binaries from being stripped.
	sed -i 's/\($(INSTALL).*\) -s \(.*[(sudo|visudo)]\)/\1 \2/g' Makefile.in
}

src_compile() {
	local line ROOTPATH

	# FIXME: secure_path is a compile time setting. using ROOTPATH
	# is not perfect, env-update may invalidate this, but until it
	# is available as a sudoers setting this will have to do.
	einfo "Setting secure_path..."

		# why not use grep? variable might be expanded from other variables
		# declared in that file. cannot just source the file, would override
		# any variables already set.
		eval `PS4= bash -x /etc/profile.env 2>&1 | \
			while read line; do
				case $line in
					ROOTPATH=*) echo $line; break;;
					*) continue;;
				esac
			done`  && einfo "	Found ROOTPATH..." || \
				ewarn "	Failed to find ROOTPATH, please report this."

		# remove any duplicate entries
		ROOTPATH=$(cleanpath /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/opt/bin${ROOTPATH:+:${ROOTPATH}})

	einfo "...done."

	# XXX: --disable-path-info closes an info leak, but may be confusing.
	# XXX: /bin/vi may not be available, make nano visudo's default.
	econf --with-secure-path="${ROOTPATH}" \
		--with-editor=/bin/nano \
		--with-env-editor \
		$(use_with offensive insults) \
		$(use_with offensive all-insults) \
		$(use_with pam) \
		$(use_with skey) \
		$(use_with ldap) || die

	# disallow lazy bindings
	emake SUDO_LDFLAGS="-Wl,-z,now" || die
}

src_install() {
	einstall || die
	dodoc BUGS CHANGES HISTORY PORTING README RUNSON TODO \
		TROUBLESHOOTING UPGRADE sample.*

	use ldap && { dodoc README.LDAP; dosbin sudoers2ldif; }

	if has_version virtual/pam; then
		pamd_mimic_system sudo auth account password session
	else
		newpamd ${FILESDIR}/sudo-1.6.8_p8 sudo
	fi

	insinto /etc
	doins ${FILESDIR}/sudoers
	fperms 0440 /etc/sudoers
}

# remove duplicate path entries from $1
cleanpath() {
	local i=1 x n IFS=:
	local -a paths;	paths=($1)

	for ((n=${#paths[*]}-1;i<=n;i++)); do
		for ((x=0;x<i;x++)); do
			test "${paths[i]}" == "${paths[x]}" && {
				einfo "	Duplicate entry ${paths[i]} removed..." 1>&2
				unset paths[i]; continue 2; }
		done; # einfo "	Adding ${paths[i]}..." 1>&2
	done; echo "${paths[*]}"
}

# add $1 to default env_delete list.
sudo_bad_var() {
	local target='env.c' marker='\*initial_badenv_table\[\]'

	ebegin "	$1"
		sed -i 's#\(^.*'${marker}'.*$\)#\1\n\t"'${1}'",#' ${S}/${target}
	eend $?
}

pkg_postinst() {
	use skey && use pam && {
		 ewarn "sudo will not use skey authentication when compiled with"
		 ewarn "pam support."
		 ewarn "To allow users to authenticate with one time passwords,"
		 ewarn "you should unset the pam USE flag for sudo."
	}
}